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Abstract This chapter begins with a description of the Paris Climate Agreement, 
which was formulated during the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in late 
2015. The goal of this agreement is to limit future emission of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) such that global warming will not exceed 1.5 °C (target) or 2.0 °C (upper 
limit). Future emissions of GHGs are based on unilateral pledges submitted by 
UNFCCC member nations, called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs). We compare the global emission of GHGs calculated from the INDCs to 
the emissions that had been used to formulate the various Representative 
Concentration Pathway (RCP) trajectories for future atmospheric abundance of 
GHGs. The RCP 4.5 scenario is particularly important, because our Empirical 
Model of Global Climate (EM-GC) indicates there is a reasonably good probability 
(~75 %) the Paris target will be achieved, and an excellent probability (>95 %) the 
upper limit for global warming will be attained, if the future atmospheric abundance 
of GHGs follows RCP 4.5. Our analysis of the Paris INDCs shows GHG emissions 
could remain below RCP 4.5 out to year 2060 if: (1) conditional as well as uncon-
ditional INDCs are followed; (2) reductions in GHG emissions needed to achieve 
the Paris INDC commitments, which generally stop at 2030, are propagated forward 
to 2060. Prior and future emissions of GHGs are graphically illustrated to provide 
context for the reductions needed to place global GHG emissions on the RCP 4.5 
trajectory.
Keywords Paris Climate Agreement • Paris INDCs • Greenhouse gas emissions • 
CO2- equivalent emissions • Unconditional INDC • Conditional INDC
3.1  Introduction
The Paris Climate Agreement has a structure distinctly different than its predeces-
sor, the Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol was approved at the third meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Kyoto, Japan during December, 1997. The 
goal of Kyoto was to minimize the adverse effects of climate change due to rising 
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levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs).1 The governing document focused on reducing 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluo-
rocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) (Article 3), 
known as the Kyoto basket of GHGs. The world was split into two categories: 
Annex I nations (Table 3.1) and the rest of the world, which we refer to as the Non- 
Annex I nations. The Annex I nations consist of what most would have considered 
to be a reasonably good representation of the developed world in 1997.
According to the terms of the Protocol, Annex I nations had varying emission 
reduction targets for the Kyoto basket of GHGs, relative to emissions in year 1990 
from that particular country. Total emissions of GHGs were combined into a single 
emission metric, termed CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emission, attained by multiplying 
the annual emissions of each compound by the global warming potential of that com-
pound.2 Each Annex I signatory nation negotiated an emission reduction target, except 
that the 15 European nations agreed to follow a single, combined target referred to as 
EU15. The target for the US was a 7 % reduction in CO2-eq emissions and the EU15 
target was an 8 % reduction, both to be achieved by 2005 relative to 1990. The largest 
reduction was 8 % (shared by several other nations in addition to EU15). Some signa-
tories were allowed to increase emissions at a prescribed limit to growth, such as 
1 See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php for the actual docu-
ment; versions in many other languages at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
2 Typically, emissions are quantified as mass of each compound released over a year, and GWPs are 
based on the use of a 100-year time horizon for the governing equation. By definition, the GWP for 
CO2, regardless of the source, is unity (i.e., equals 1). Numerous complications arise from the CO2-
equivalence convention, most notably the fact that best-estimates of GWPs change over time 
(Table 1.2), and often papers and reports do not document which GWP was actually used. 
Throughout this book, we use GWPs for CH4 and N2O of 28 and 265, respectively, unless other-
wise stated. Another complication is that the effect of inadvertent release of CH4 on global warming 
over the decadal time scale is not properly represented by the use of GWP on a 100-year time 
horizon, as discussed in Sects. 1.2.2 and 4.4.2, as well as by Pierrehumbert (2014).
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Australia which agreed to have CO2-eq emissions in 2005 be no more than 8 % larger 
than had occurred in 1990. The highest increase allowed was 10 %, for Iceland.
A few more pertinent details of the Kyoto Protocol follow. The Protocol allowed 
nations to use reductions in CO2 attributed to land use change (LUC) to meet their 
commitment,3 provided the decline in emission occurred due to direct human 
induced LUC since 1990. Kyoto included three mechanisms to assist nations in 
meeting their targets: Joint Implementation,4 Clean Development,5 and Emissions 
Trading.6 If a country or the EU15 group failed to achieve their target during the first 
commitment period, which ended in 2012, two consequences ensued: a 30 % 
 penalty of additional emission reductions for the second commitment period, and 
suspension of the ability to sell emissions trading credits. Details of the Kyoto 
Protocol were continually refined at subsequent meetings of the UNFCCC COP, 
held annually towards the end of the calendar year.7
There has been so much written about the Kyoto Protocol that references hardly 
seem necessary. At the time of writing, the Amazon website returns 5011 results for 
a search on “Kyoto protocol” in Books. We do, however, suggest The Collapse of 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming (Victor 2001) as a 
concise and accessible account of this agreement and its subsequent amendments, 
including thoughtful exposition about positive aspects of the Protocol as well as 
suggestions for what could have been done better.
The Kyoto Protocol did not place restrictions on GHG emissions from develop-
ing countries (i.e., all countries not listed in Table 3.1). A sub-group of Annex I 
nations, termed Annex II and consisting of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States, were tasked with 
providing financial support for the development of technology to reduce GHG emis-
sions in developing countries. 
At some point in time, the Kyoto Protocol had been signed and ratified by all 
nations except Afghanistan, Southern Sudan, Taiwan, and the United States.8 
Canada withdrew from Kyoto in 2011, due to perceived pressure on the extraction 
of bitumen from Canadian tar sands. The US Congress failed to ratify the Protocol, 
3 The official language for LUC in the Protocol calls this land use, land-use change and forestry and 
uses the abbreviation of LULUCF. Here and throughout, we use the more simple abbreviation 
LUC, with recognition of the importance of forestry.
4 Joint implementation allowed Annex I countries to implement projects that reduce emissions or 
increase natural GHG sinks in other Annex I countries; such projects could be counted towards the 
emission reductions of the investing country.
5 Clean Development allows Annex I countries to implement projects that reduce emissions or 
increase natural GHG sinks in non-Annex I countries; such projects can be counted towards the 
emission reductions of the investing country.
6 Annex I countries could purchase emission units from other Annex I countries that found it easier 
to reduce their own emissions.
7 A UNFCCC COP schedule is at http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/6240.php
8 Observer nations Andorra and Vatican City are sometimes listed as non-participants, but their 
emissions are too small to matter, plus Vatican City answers to a higher authority.
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which required Congressional Approval because it was viewed as a treaty by the US 
Government. In fact, on 25 July 1997 the Senate of the 105th Congress approved, 
by a vote of 95 to 0, a resolution9 that declared:
the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol to, or other agreement regarding, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, at negotiations in 
Kyoto in December 1997 or thereafter which would: (1) mandate new commitments to limit 
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex 1 Parties, unless the protocol or other 
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce green-
house gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period; or 
(2) result in serious harm to the US economy.
This resolution was passed six months prior to the Kyoto meeting. Since the 
Protocol did not include “specific scheduled commitments” to limit GHG reduc-
tions from developing countries, approval by the US Congress was always going to 
be an uphill battle (Victor 2001; Falkner et al. 2010).
On 12 November 2014, nearly 20 years after the Kyoto meeting, President 
Obama of the US and President Xi of China announced a set of crucially important, 
bilateral GHG reduction targets.10 According to their announcement, by 2025 the 
US would reduce its total GHG emissions to be 26–28 % below the total emission 
that had occurred in 2005. China agreed to have their CO2 emissions peak by 2030 
and to make best effort to peak early. China also stated it would increase its share of 
the use of non-fossil fuels in its primary energy consumption to about 20 % by 
2030. There were a variety of other actions, such as joint efforts to phase down the 
global use of HFCs, a class of GHGs introduced by the ban on chlorofluorocarbons 
to comply with the Montreal Protocol (Velders et al. 2007; see also Sect. 1.2.3.5), 
promote energy efficiency in buildings, and support research into carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) technologies (Sect. 4.2).
The structure of the Paris Climate Agreement is quite different than that of the 
Kyoto Protocol. First and foremost, the Paris Agreement has specific goals for limit-
ing future global warming relative to the pre-industrial baseline. The Agreement11 
seeks to reduce cumulative emission of GHGs such that the increase in global mean 
surface temperature (GMST) is “well below 2 °C” and to “pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial”. Throughout this book, we 
have interpreted these two numbers as being the “Paris target of 1.5 °C warming” 
and the “Paris upper limit of 2.0 °C warming”.
The second aspect of the Paris Agreement that differs from the Kyoto Protocol is 
that individual nations were encouraged to submit, prior to the COP 21 meeting in 
Paris, their unilateral Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) for the 
reduction of GHG emissions. There are two types of INDCs: unconditional (firm 
commitments) and conditional (commitments contingent on financial assistance 








developing world are conditional. The Green Climate Fund (Sect. 4.3), established 
during COP 15, is recognized as one of several means to facilitate the flow of 
resources needed to implement the conditional INDCs. The Paris INDCs consider 
the original Kyoto basket of GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF6) plus 
NF3, which was added at the COP 17 meeting held in Durban, South Africa during 
2011.12 Below, we refer to this group of seven as the UNFCCC basket of GHGs.
The Obama-Xi announcement was instrumental in the framing of the Paris 
Climate Agreement. The INDCs submitted by the US and China, both uncondi-
tional, build closely on the language of this bilateral plan. These nations emit more 
GHGs than any other: China bypassed the US to become the world’s largest emitter 
of CO2 during 2006. The importance of these two nations arriving at mutually 
agreeable language to combat global warming, prior to the Paris meeting, cannot be 
understated. To date, INDCs from 190 out of the 196 nations in the world have been 
submitted to UNFCCC. For the first time in history, there is consensus among the 
world’s nations that a collective effort is needed to combat global warming.
Much will be written comparing and contrasting the Paris Climate Agreement and 
the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Climate Agreement has a top-down, quantitative goal of 
limiting global warming from rising either 1.5 °C (target) or 2.0 °C (upper limit) above 
pre-industrial. The method of achieving the necessary reduction in GHG emissions is 
a bottom-up approach, conducted via unilateral INDCs. The Obama administration 
maintains the agreement is not a treaty and, as such, does not require Congressional 
approval. The Obama administration has proposed to fulfill the US commitment via the 
Clean Power Plan, an Environmental Protection Agency proposal to limit the emission 
of CO2 from power plants within each of the 50 states (Sect. 4.4.2).
An overview of the historical emission of GHGs is provided in Sect. 3.2. 
Agreements such as Paris do not occur in a vacuum: i.e., an enormous amount of 
effort takes place prior to each COP meeting. Past emissions, economic resources, 
technology, and each nation’s perspective on environmental responsibility play 
large roles in the framing of the guiding document as well as the content of indi-
vidual INDCs. Past emissions of GHGs are illustrated in Sect. 3.2, both globally and 
nationally, because these data are readily available and provide an interesting back-
drop to the Paris Climate Agreement.
Global emissions of GHGs implied by the Paris INDCs are quantified in Sect. 
3.3. Projected emissions of GHGs inferred from the Paris INDCs are compared to 
the emissions that were used to drive the RCP 8.5 (Riahi et al. 2011), RCP 4.5 
(Thomson et al. 2011), and RCP 2.6 (van Vuuren et al. 2011) scenarios, which are 
central to IPCC (2013). The RCP 4.5 scenario is a particularly important bench-
mark. Calculations shown in Chap. 2, conducted using our Empirical Model of 
Global Climate (EM-GC) (Canty et al. 2013), indicate there is a reasonably high 
probability (~75 %) that the Paris target of 1.5 °C warming will be achieved, and an 
excellent probability (>95 %) that global warming will remain below 2.0 °C, if the 
12 http://unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/in_focus/items/6672.php. The decision to add NF3 
to the Kyoto basket was made at Durban, South Africa in 2011, this GHG was formally added via 
an amendment to the protocol approved in Doha, Qatar in 2012. More information about NF3 is 
given in Sect. 1.2.3.5.
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atmospheric abundance of GHGs follows RCP 4.5. Conversely, there is little to no 
chance these warming limits will be achieved if emissions follow RCP 8.5.
Our evaluation of GHG emissions comes with an important condition as well as a 
crucial caveat. The condition is that, to properly evaluate the Paris Agreement, emissions 
of GHGs must be examined at least out to year 2060. Most of the INDCs extend only to 
year 2030. As shown in Sects. 3.3 and 4.2, the 2030–2060 time period is crucial. 
Assuming populations continue to grow and standards of living continue to rise as pro-
jected, then the production of a large amount of total global energy by methods that 
release little or no atmospheric GHGs by 2060 will be vital for the achievement of the 
Paris Agreement. While it is tempting to extend the comparison of GHG emission pro-
jections out to 2100, it is not realistic to consider policy measures out to end of century. 
However, power plants commissioned during the next decade will almost certainly be 
designed to be operational in 2030. As shown in Sect. 4.2, for the world to achieve the 
reduction in GHG emissions needed to lie along the RCP 4.5 trajectory in 2060, we must 
meet about half of the projected global demand for energy without releasing GHGs to 
the atmosphere. For this to happen, it is incumbent that planning begin now.
The crucial caveat of our projections is that use of RCP 4.5 as the benchmark for 
evaluating the Paris Agreement depends on the veracity of the calculations conducted 
using our EM-GC framework. The coupled atmospheric, oceanic general circulation 
models (GCMs) used extensively by IPCC (2013) indicate that the RCP 2.6 scenario 
(van Vuuren et al. 2011), which imposes much tighter constraints on GHG emissions 
than RCP 4.5, is the appropriate benchmark for Paris (Rogelj et al. 2016). In Chap. 
2, values of the Attributable Anthropogenic Warming Rate (AAWR) inferred from 
the climate record were compared to AAWR from GCMs. We concluded that GCMs 
tend to warm too quickly, by a rate that exceeds the observed warming rate by nearly 
a factor of two. Our conclusion that GCMs warm too quickly is consistent with the 
findings of Chap. 11 of IPCC (2013), particularly their expert judgement of projected 
warming over the next two decades that plays a prominent role in our Chap. 2.
The global warming target (1.5 °C) and upper limit (2.0 °C) of the Paris Climate 
Agreement will undoubtedly spur many other evaluations of GCMs, as well as other 
empirical forecasts of global warming. If the consensus of this research demonstrates 
that RCP 2.6 is indeed a more appropriate benchmark for achieving the goal of Paris 
than RCP 4.5, then GHG emissions will need to be reduced much faster than in the 
present INDC commitments to have any hope of achieving either the target or upper 
limit of the Paris Climate Agreement (Rogelj et al. 2016; see also Sect. 4.2).
3.2  Prior Emissions
Here, an overview of the historical emission of GHGs is provided. Numerous papers, 
reports, and blogs focus solely on emissions of CO2 (Pacala and Socolow 2004; 
Canadell et al. 2007; Raupach et al. 2007; Friedlingstein et al. 2014), in most cases 
due only to the combustion of fossil fuels. However, the Paris Climate Agreement 
covers the UNFCCC basket of GHGs, and CO2 emission from land use change, in 
addition to fossil fuels. As shown below, the average global, per-capita emission of 
3 Paris INDCs
121
CO2, CH4, and N2O summed among all human sources is about 7.5 metric tons of 
CO2-eq per person per year. Conversely, the global, per-capita emission of CO2 due 
to the combustion of fossil fuels is about 5 metric tons of CO2 per person per year. 
Adding CH4, N2O, and CO2 from LUC to the mix requires even steeper cuts in total 
GHG emissions to achieve the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement than would be 
needed if the focus were solely on release of CO2 from combustion of fossil fuels.
Prior emission of GHGs by individual nations played an important role in the 
framing of the Paris Climate Agreement. Many of the INDCs use language that 
makes specific reference to prior emissions. We therefore show maps of national 
emissions of GHGs, presented in terms of CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels 
as well as human emission of CO2, CH4, and N2O from all sources.
In the material that follows, our focus is solely on anthropogenic emission of CO2, 
CH4, and N2O. This is not to diminish the importance of other GHGs, as well as other 
human drivers of climate change such as rising tropospheric O3 and industrial release 
of CFCs and other ozone depleting substances (Fig. 1.4). We neglect tropospheric O3 
here because the precursors of tropospheric O3 are regulated by Air Quality policy 
makers rather than the climate community. We neglect ozone depleting substances 
because these compounds are regulated, quite effectively, by the Montreal Protocol 
(Sect. 1.2.3.4). And, we do not discuss other fluorine-bearing GHGs such as HFCs, 
PFCs, SF6, and NF3 because, to date, their contribution to the RF of climate has been 
small (Fig. 1.4). Projections of the future radiative impacts of HFCs, PFCs, SF6, and 
NF3, due to market forces independent of the Paris Climate Agreement, are discussed 
in Sect. 1.2.3.5. The climate impact of HFCs could be considerable in the future, 
particularly if compounds with extremely high GWPs are left unregulated (Velders 
et al. 2009). As discussed in Chap. 1, future regulation of HFCs has recently been 
approved by the Parties of the Montreal Protocol. Given this effort, plus the very 
minor role attributed to SF6, PFCs, and HFCs out to 2060 in the RCP projections, it 
seemed prudent to restrict our focus to the big three: CO2, CH4, and N2O.
3.2.1  Global
Figure 3.1a illustrates global, annual emission of atmospheric CO2 from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels, over the prior two centuries. As noted in Sect. 1.2.3.2, about 
half of the CO2 released to the atmosphere by human activity remains airborne, 
while the rest is removed by either the world’s oceans or terrestrial biosphere 
(mainly trees). This figure shows the total global, annual emission of atmospheric 
CO2 from the combustion of coal, natural gas, liquid fuels, cement manufacture, and 
gas flaring (CO2FF), obtained from the US Carbon Dioxide Information and Analysis 
Center (CDIAC)(Boden et al. 2013; Le Quéré et al. 2015). Data are shown in units 
of Gt CO2 per year.13 Global population is also shown.
13 1 Gt of CO2 = 109 metric tons of CO2. Emissions of CO2 are expressed either as Gt C or Gt CO2. 
Emissions given in Gt C can be converted to Gt CO2 by multiplying the value by 3.664 (Table 1 of 
Le Quéré et al. (2015)).
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Figure 3.1b shows global, per-capita emission of CO2 from the combustion of 
fossil fuel,14 which we abbreviate as pCGL. Values of pCGL are presented in units of 
metric tons of CO2 per person per year, abbreviated as t CO2 ppy. There was a steady 
rise in pCGL from 1856, which marks the beginning of the mass production of steel 
(Adams and Dirlam 1966), until the start of World War I. A hiatus in pCGL then 
occurred until the end of World War II, followed by a rapid rise until 1973. Most of 
this growth drove the economic development of the US, Europe, and the former 
USSR. Many attribute the abrupt leveling off of pCGL in 1973 to the rapid rise in the 
price of oil that followed the 6-day Yom Kippur war between Egypt and Israel (first 
Oil Shock) (Hamilton 2003). This second hiatus in pCGL lasted until 2000. During 
this 27 year period, there was a series of world events, such as a second rapid rise in 
the price of oil driven by the Iranian revolution (second Oil Shock) and the 1980s 
economic recession, all of which contributed to significant increases in carbon effi-
ciency within the developed world. Since 2002, the economic development of China 
has led to a third period marked by a rise in pCGL (Le Quéré et al. 2015). It is 
remarkable how many world events are apparent in the record of per-capita con-









































































Fig. 3.1 Total global emission of atmospheric CO2. (a) Emission of CO2 from combustion of fos-
sil fuels, flaring, and cement manufacture (CO2FF, grey shaded) as well as global population 
(green), from 1820 to 2014; (b) per-capita emission of global atmospheric CO2 (pCGL) expressed 
in metric tons of CO2 per person, per year (t CO2 ppy). World events associated with changes in 
pCGL are noted. See Methods for further information
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sumption of fossil fuel, which has had two distinct growth spurts (1860–1910; 
1950–1973) and appears to be entering a third period of growth.
The Paris INDCs focus on reducing the emission of the UNFCCC basket of 
GHGs, expressed in terms of CO2-eq (Sect. 3.1). Release of CO2 by the combustion 
of fossil fuel is the most important contributor to this total GHG emission burden. 
Total anthropogenic emission of CH4, which is released to the atmosphere by many 
aspects of our industrialized world (Sect. 1.2.3.3), is the second largest contributor. 
The release of CO2 by land use change (CO2LUC) and the emission of N2O (Sect. 
1.2.3.4) make additional contributions, nearly equal in magnitude, that must be con-
sidered when examining the Paris INDCs.
Figure 3.2a shows a time series of CO2-eq emission of GHGs. The four most 
important terms are included: CO2FF, CO2LUC, CH4, and N2O. Global population is 
also shown in Fig. 3.2a. The per-capita emission of GHGs in the Paris INDC 
 relevant metric, CO2-eq, is shown in Fig. 3.2b. The quotient of CO2-eq emissions 
divided by global population, which reflects the globally averaged contribution to 
global warming by the world’s population, is termed pCEQ-GL.
Figure 3.3 shows the breakdown of anthropogenic release of CH4 and N2O, in 
CO2-eq units. Figure 3.3a shows emission estimates for CH4 and N2O from the same 

















































































Fig. 3.2 Total global emission of atmospheric CO2, CH4, and N2O. (a) Emission of CO2 from 
combustion of fossil fuels (CO2FF; same as Fig. 3.1), anthropogenic emission of CH4 plus N2O 
expressed as CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) (blue), and emission of CO2 from land use change (CO2LUC, 
red); global population (green) is also shown; (b) per-capita emission of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + 
N2O, termed pCEQ-GL, expressed in metric tons of CO2-eq per person, per year (t CO2-eq ppy). 
World events associated with changes in pCEQ-GL are noted. See Methods for further information
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emission of GHGs throughout this book. In this case, the two estimates represent an 
attempt to harmonize the emissions used to drive the RCP scenarios with atmo-
spheric observations of CH4 and N2O.15 Emissions of CH4, expressed as CO2-eq 
using a 100-year time horizon, constitute about 80 % of the sum.
Figures 3.3b, c compare the RCP emissions of CH4 and N2O, respectively, to 
values from the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR)16 
database (Rogelj et al. 2014). The two estimates for CH4 are in very good agree-
ment. However, they both use similar (or perhaps the same) measurements of the 
atmospheric abundance of CH4 versus time (Fig. 2.1 ) to guide the respective time 
series. Both emission time series show that human release of CH4 appears to have 
stalled in the 1990s, before pickup up in the most recent decade. The precise reason 
for this behavior is the subject of considerable uncertainty, perhaps best summa-
rized by Kirschke et al. (2013), who in their abstract state:
Although uncertainties in emission trends do not allow definitive conclusions to be drawn, 
we show that the observed stabilization of methane levels between 1999 and 2006 can poten-
tially be explained by decreasing-to-stable fossil fuel emissions, combined with stable- to-
15 See http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps for further information.

































































Fig. 3.3 Total global emissions of atmospheric CH4 and N2O. (a) Emission of CH4 (blue) and N2O 
(green) expressed as CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) from the RCP Potsdam database (Meinshausen 
et al. 2011); (b) comparison of global emissions of CH4 from the RCP Potsdam database and from 
the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) version 4.2 FT2012 database 
(Rogelj et al. 2014); (c) same as panel (b), but for N2O. See Methods for further information
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increasing microbial emissions. We show that a rise in natural wetland emissions and fossil 
fuel emissions probably accounts for the renewed increase in global methane levels after 
2006, although the relative contribution of these two sources remains uncertain.
Figure 3.3c compares the RCP (Meinshausen et al. 2011) and EDGAR (Rogelj 
et al. 2014) estimates of the global emission of N2O. Clearly there are common roots 
to these two estimates, based on the synchronization of the fluctuations. However, the 
RCP estimate exceeds the EDGAR by about 1 Gt CO2-eq, for reasons that are unclear.
The emissions of CH4 and N2O from EDGAR and RCP have been compared in 
Fig. 3.3 because of their complementary importance to this book. The emissions 
from RCP, which are provided globally, extend back to 1765 (Meinshausen et al. 
2011). This allows the historical evolution of the most important subset of the 
UNFCCC basket of GHGs (i.e., CO2, CH4, and N2O) to be examined over the past 
two centuries (Fig. 3.2). Conversely, the emissions from EDGAR extend back to 
1970. However, EDGAR documents national emissions of CH4 and N2O for each 
year, from 1970 to present. This is vitally important information for assessing 
national burdens towards global warming, as well as the evaluating the Paris INDCs.
We now turn our attention to comparing and contrasting the time series of per- 
capita emission of CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels (pCGL) (Fig. 3.2a) with 
per-capita emission of all human sources of CO2, CH4, and N2O (pCEQ-GL) (Fig. 3.2b). 
Most of the world events are still evident in pCEQ-GL (Fig. 3.2), but all of the signatures 
are less dramatic than for per-capita release of CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels 
(Fig. 3.1). The exponential rise of pCGL prior to 1910 (Fig. 3.1b) is replaced by a slow, 
steady, nearly linear rise in pCEQ-GL (Fig. 3.2b) over this same period of time. The time 
series for pCEQ-GL has a much stronger representation of agriculture than the time 
series of pCGL. Much of the atmospheric release of CH4 and N2O, historically, has 
been associated with the production of food (Sects. 1.2.3.3 and 1.2.3.4), as has CO2 
released due to land use change. The recent rise in the release of atmospheric CO2 due 
to the development of China imposes a different signature when viewed in the context 
of only fossil fuel CO2 (start of 3d growth spurt, Fig. 3.1b) than when examined using 
the UNFCCC basket of GHGs (moderate uptick, Fig. 3.2b). The major reason for the 
different appearance, when viewed using these two metrics, is a slower rate of rise of 
the human release of CH4 (Fig. 3.3b) during the time when emission of CO2 from the 
combustion of fossil fuel from China had accelerated.
The contrast in how per-capita emissions appear, when viewed in terms of release 
of CO2 by the combustion of fossil fuels versus release of the UNFCCC basket of 
GHGs, epitomizes the challenge faced for achievement of the Paris Climate Agreement. 
The world’s peoples must eat. Production of food imposes a considerable burden on 
atmospheric CH4 and N2O, as well as atmospheric CO2 from the parts of the world that 
rely on slash and burn agriculture. Whereas future levels of N2O are projected to rise in 
both RCP 2.6 (van Vuuren et al. 2011) and RCP 4.5 (Thomson et al. 2011), future 
levels of CH4 decline by end of century for both of these RCP scenarios (Fig. 2.1). 
Reducing the emission of the UNFCCC basket of GHGs will require developing meth-
ods to feed a growing global population while, at the same time, reducing emissions of 
CH4, N2O, and CO2 from land use change. We would be remiss if we did not mention 
that emission of GHGs could be reduced, particularly the release of CH4, if more of the 




Figure 3.4 shows maps of the emission of CO2 due to combustion of fossil fuels, flaring, 
and cement manufacture from individual nations (CO2FF-IN) for four selected years. Data 
are based on national inventories maintained and regularly updated by the US CDIAC 
(Boden et al. 2013), and are shown in units of Gt CO2 per year. The maps reflect modern 
political boundaries. The CDIAC estimates are widely used in the climate community 
and are generally considered to be very reliable (Le Quéré et al. 2015), although there is 
some debate about the accuracy of the estimates for China in recent years (Guan et al. 
2012; Liu et al. 2015). Our maps rely on the most recent CDIAC emission estimates for 
China, as well as other nations, to ensure a consistent approach for all countries.
Figure 3.5 shows national maps of per-capita release of CO2 due to the combus-
tion of fossil fuel (pCIN). The population of individual nations is based on data 
provided by the Population Division of the United Nations (UN) Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (see Methods, Fig. 3.1). Values of pCIN are presented 
in units of metric tons of CO2 per person per year, abbreviated as t CO2 ppy.
Fig. 3.4 Atmospheric fossil fuel CO2 emission maps, 1950–2010. Emissions of CO2FF-IN in units 
of 109 metric tons of CO2 per year (Gt CO2 year−1). Maps reflect modern political boundaries. The 
progression of CO2FF-IN from 1950 onwards is more informative when viewed as an animation, 




The US emitted 2.6 Gt CO2 in 1950, which was the largest individual national 
source, followed by the former Soviet Union and the UK, at 0.67 and 0.52 Gt CO2, 
respectively (Fig. 3.4). At that time, there was a wide disparity in pCIN. The island 
nation of Bahrain led the way at 29.5 t CO2 ppy, followed by Luxembourg and 
Kuwait at 25.1 and 20.0 t CO2 ppy, respectively. We have chosen both the color bar 
for Fig. 3.5 (does not cover the full range of pCIN) and the method of presentation 
(world map) to highlight major emitters in terms of CO2FF-IN, rather than small 
nations that have very large values of pCIN. Of the major emitters in 1950 (i.e., top 
six emitters in terms of CO2FF-IN), the US had a pCIN of 16.3 t CO2 ppy, followed by 
Canada and the UK, at 11.6 and 10.3 t CO2 ppy, respectively. In 1950, China emitted 
0.081 Gt CO2, with a per-capita emission of 0.15 t CO2 ppy.
The release of CO2 by the combustion of fossil fuels was in the midst of a rapid rise 
in 1970 (Fig. 3.1). The US was the largest emitter, at 4.38 Gt CO2, followed by the 
former Soviet Union and Germany, at 2.32 and 1.04 Gt CO2, respectively (Fig. 3.4). In 
1970, the largest per-capita emissions were from the nations of Qatar, UAE, and Brunei 
Darussalam, at 69.2, 64.9, and 63.3 t CO2 ppy, respectively. Of the top six emitters in 
Fig. 3.5 Per-capita fossil fuel CO2 emission maps, 1950–2010. Per-capita national emissions of 
CO2FF, termed pCIN, in units of metric tons of CO2 per person per year (t CO2 ppy). The color bar 
was chosen to highlight emissions from large nations that dominate the global burden of total emis-
sions, and therefore does not cover the full range of pCIN. In 2010, the largest values of pCIN were 
from Qatar and the nation of Trinidad and Tobago, at 44.7 and 39.5 t CO2 ppy, respectively. See 
Methods for further information
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terms of CO2FF-IN, the US had the highest per-capita emission at 20.9 t CO2 ppy, fol-
lowed by Germany and the UK at 13.3 and 12.2 t CO2 ppy, respectively (Fig. 3.5). In 
1970, China emitted 0.97 Gt CO2, with a per-capita emission of 0.78 t CO2 ppy.
The global value of CO2FF was lower in 1990 compared to 1970, due to improve-
ments in efficiency spurred by the two oil shocks, as well as the economic recession 
of the 1980s (Fig. 3.1). The US was still the largest emitter, at 4.95 Gt CO2, followed 
by the former Soviet Union and China, at 3.72 and 2.50 Gt CO2, respectively 
(Fig. 3.4). Largest per-capita emissions in 1990 were from UAE, Singapore, and 
Luxembourg, at 29.2, 28.8, and 27.2 t CO2 ppy, respectively. Of the major emitters, 
the US had the highest per-capita emission at 19.6 t CO2 ppy, followed by Germany 
and the former Soviet Union, at 13.1 and 12.9 t CO2 ppy, respectively (Fig. 3.5). In 
1990, the per-capita emission of CO2FF-IN from China was 2.15 t CO2 ppy.
In 2010, global emissions of CO2 due to the combustion of fossil fuels had 
reached an all-time high of 33.5 Gt CO2 (Fig. 3.1).17 China was the largest emitter, 
at 8.38 Gt CO2, followed by the United States and India, at 5.56 and 1.97 Gt CO2, 
respectively (Fig. 3.4). Had the former Soviet Union remained together, the com-
bined emissions of member nations would have been 2.65 Gt CO2 in 2010. Russia 
emitted 1.77 Gt CO2 in 2010, which was the fourth highest national total. Largest 
per-capita emissions in 2010 were from Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and Kuwait, at 
44.7, 39.3, and 31.0 t CO2 ppy, respectively. Of the top six emitters in 2010, the US 
still had the highest per-capita emission at 17.9 t CO2 ppy, followed by Russia and 
Germany, at 12.3 and 9.7 t CO2 ppy, respectively (Fig. 3.5). In 2010, the per-capita 
emission of CO2FF-IN from India was 1.60 t CO2 ppy, whereas per-capita emissions 
from China had risen to 6.22 t CO2 ppy.
Figure 3.6 shows maps of the emission of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, expressed 
as CO2-eq, from individual nations (CO2EQ-IN) for 1990 and 2010. Emission of CH4 
and N2O from individual nations is based on EDGAR (Rogelj et al. 2014) and emis-
sion of CO2 from land use change is based on data provided by the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Houghton et al. 2012). Figure 3.7 shows 
per-capita emission of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O from the world’s nations (pCEQ-
IN), again for 1990 and 2010. As for Fig. 3.5, the color bar in Fig. 3.7 has been chosen 
to highlight the major emitters, rather than all nations. And, as noted above, values of 
CO2LUC from individual nations are available only from 1990 onwards, so global 
maps for CO2EQ-IN cannot be extended as far back in time as for CO2FF-IN.
Table 3.2 lists the top 12 emitters, in terms of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, for 
1990 and 2010. The ascension of China, which was third in global emissions in 
1990 and top in 2010, is apparent in Fig. 3.6 (national totals), Fig. 3.7 (per-capita), 
and Table 3.2. Over this two decade period, CO2EQ-IN from China nearly tripled, and 
the per-capita emission more than doubled. India, which now ranks third in the 
world in terms of national value of CO2-eq emission, saw its emissions double from 
1990 to 2010, while the per-capita emissions from this nation only rose by 35 %. As 
will be apparent in Sect. 3.3, GHG emissions from India are projected to play an 
increasingly larger role in the global total over the next four decades.
17 In 2014, another all-time high of 35.9 Gt CO2 was reached. It is likely this annual emission value 
will be surpassed in both 2015 as well as 2016, once data for these years are released.
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Table 3.2 has some additional numbers worth noting. The top 12 emitters contrib-
uted 65.3 % of the global total in 1990, and 62.6 % of the global total in 2010. Over 
this two decade period, global total emission of CO2-eq rose by 32 %, with nearly no 
change in global per-capita emissions. Most interestingly, the per-capita emission of 
the top 12, in aggregate, nearly equaled the global per-capita emission for both 1990 
and 2010. In other words, reducing the emission of GHGs to achieve the goal of the 
Paris Climate Agreement is a global problem: the actions of any one nation, or hand-
ful of nations, will have little effect unless the majority of nations participate.
In conclusion of this section, we shall make mention of the numerical entries for 
Germany in Table 3.2. The pC-eqIN of Germany fell from 15.2 t CO2 ppy in 1990 to 
10.9 t CO2 ppy in 2010. The drop in per-capita emission of Germany is also  apparent 
in Fig. 3.7. As highlighted towards the end of Chap. 4, Germany has set the standard 
for generation of energy by renewables that release little or no GHGs, which the rest 
of the world will have to emulate to achieve the goal of the Paris Climate Agreement.
Fig. 3.6 Atmospheric GHG emission maps, 1990 and 2010. National emissions of CO2FF + 
CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O in units of 109 metric tons of CO2-eq per year (Gt CO2-eq year−1). See 
Methods for further information
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3.3  Future Emissions
Future emissions of GHGs are now examined. As noted in the Introduction, our 
focus is on emissions of CO2 due to combustion of fossil fuel18 and land use change, 
as well as anthropogenic emissions of CH4 and N2O: i.e., the primary drivers of 
18 The fossil fuel category also includes emissions from the manufacture of cement and from flar-
ing, which are traditionally lumped into the FF category. Also, all estimates for individual nations 
or groups of nations include estimates from the combustion of bunker fuels, which is the term used 
to refer to the mixture of hydrocarbons burned by ships.
Fig. 3.7 Per-capita atmospheric GHG emission maps, 1990 and 2010. Per-capita national emis-
sions of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, termed pCEQ-IN, in units of metric tons of CO2-eq per person 
per year (t CO2-eq ppy). As for Fig. 3.4, the color bar was chosen to highlight emissions from large 
nations that dominate the global burden of total emissions. In 2010, the largest values of pCEQ-IN 
were from Qatar and Trinidad and Tobago, at 75.4 and 54.3 t CO2-eq ppy, respectively. See 
Methods for further information
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climate change that are addressed by the Paris Climate Agreement. All emissions 
are expressed in CO2-eq, found using GWPs of 28 and 265, respectively, for CH4 
and N2O (Table 1.1). For the four figures described in this section, total global emis-
sions are shown in all of the top panels. The global emissions from our projections 
are always represented using grey shading. The thick grey line represents a projec-
tion for the UN mid-fertility growth population projection, whereas the top and 
bottom bounds of the grey shaded region represent emission estimates for high- 
fertility and low-fertility population projections, respectively. Hence, the grey 
shaded region represents our estimate of the impact of population on the global 
emissions of CO2-eq.
The US, China and India are the top three emitters, nationally, of CO2-eq 
(Table 3.2). Therefore, we have chosen to highlight the emission projections from 
these three nations in the middle and lower panels of the four figures shown in this 
section. Projections are also shown for Annex I* nations (i.e., all nations listed in 
Table 3.1 other than US), and non-Annex I* nations (i.e., all nations not listed in 
Table 3.1 other than the China and India). We are aware that the Paris Climate 
Agreement does not make explicit reference to Annex I and non-Annex I nations. 
Nonetheless, this still seems like a reasonable way to represent the Developed and 
Developing World, which are referenced in the Paris document.
Figure 3.8 shows projections for the Business as Usual (BAU) scenario. As detailed 
in Methods, our BAU estimate of global CO2-eq emissions (grey) considers projec-
tions of population from the UN, and forecasts of gross domestic product (GDP) from 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2016). Data 
for CO2-eq emissions from the five groups (US, China, India, Annex I*, and non-
Annex I*) from 2000 to 2014 are used to define time series of carbon intensity, IC, 
Table 3.2 Top Emitters, CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4| + N2O
2010 1990
Nation CO2EQ-IN pCEQ-IN Nation CO2EQ-IN pCEQ-IN
China 10.65 7.9 US 5.75 22.8
US 6.15 19.8 USSR 5.38 18.7
India 2.87 2.3 China 3.83 3.30
Russia 2.39 16.7 Brazil 1.65 11.0
Indonesia 2.11 8.7 India 1.48 1.7
Brazil 1.72 8.7 Indonesia 1.42 7.8
Japan 1.13 8.9 Germany 1.20 15.2
Germany 0.88 10.9 Japan 1.17 9.6
Canada 0.85 24.8 UK 0.78 13.6
Iran 0.75 10.2 Canada 0.65 22.3
Mexico 0.66 5.6 France 0.53 9.37
Saudi Arabia 0.64 22.6 Poland 0.53 13.7
Sum, Top 12 30.79 7.82 Sum, Top 12 24.36 7.41
Global 49.19 7.37 Global 37.32 7.53
CO2EQ-IN in units of Gt CO2 per year; pCEQ-IN in units of t CO2 ppy
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where IC = (CO2-eq emission)/(GDP). Past data are used to infer trends in IC, which 
are projected forward in time. The world has become more carbon efficient in the 
past several decades. Not only has pCEQ-GL fallen from 1990 to 2010 (Table 3.2 and 
Fig. 3.2b), but world economic output has risen. The BAU projections of CO2-eq 
are based on combining forecasts of IC with forecasts of GDP, an approach known 
in the climate community as the simplified Kaya Identity (Friedlingstein et al. 
2014). A more sophisticated approach, termed the full Kaya Identity, would include 
additional terms that represent energy demand and energy generation technologies 
(Raupach et al. 2007). In a sense, we have used the full Kaya Identity approach for 
Chap. 4, albeit in a global sense.
Figure 3.8a compares our projected global CO2-eq emissions (grey) to those 
from RCP 8.5, RCP 4.5, and RCP 2.6. On all of the figures described in this section, 
our projections and those from RCP represent only CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, 
found using the same numerical values of GWP. Figure 3.8a also shows projections 
of global emissions for the Kyoto basket of GHGs from the Joint Research Center 
(JRC) of the European Commission (Kitous and Keramidas 2015): their BAU pro-
jection, their analysis of the INDCs, and their estimate of the pathway needed to 
achieve the Paris upper limit of 2 °C warming. The JRC projections for INDCs are 
for unconditional only (upper orange curve) and unconditional plus conditional 
(lower orange curve). Finally, the global GHG emission projection for 2030 from 
the Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving (PBL) Environmental Assessment Agency of 
the Netherlands, hereafter PBL, is shown for BAU (Admiraal et al. 2015).19 Figure 
3.8b shows the breakdown of global CO2-eq between the US, China, India, and the 
rest of the world groups as Annex I* (surrogate for the Developed world) and non- 
Annex I*.
The BAU projections shown in Fig. 3.8 contain a few important messages. 
Without any specific attempt to control emission of GHGs, it appears total global 
emission will fall short of RCP 8.5 by 2030, albeit slightly. In 2060, the BAU 
 projection indicates China and India will be the two top emitters. Not surprisingly, 
emissions from the Developing World (non-Annex I*) are projected to grow more 
strongly than for other regions (Fig. 3.8b), even as per-capita emission from the 
Developing World lags that of other regions (Fig. 3.8c). Our baseline BAU projec-
tion for mid-fertility population growth exceeds, by a very small amount, the PBL 
BAU projection for 2030 (black dot) as well as the JRC BAU projection. However, 
the grey shaded region of our projection (uncertainty due to population) encom-
passes the BAU projections from PBL and JRC. Finally, it is evident from the impact 
of the uncertainty of projected population in 2060 that, while a lower population 
trajectory is desirable for achievement of the Paris Climate Agreement, more than 
population control must be implemented. The projected emissions in the decade 
2050–2060 for BAU lie about midway between RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5, which would 
not enable the goals of Paris to be achieved.
Figure 3.9 shows our projected global emissions of CO2-eq (grey) for a scenario 
we call Attain and Hold, Unconditional (AHUNC). For AHUNC, we have assumed emis-


























































































Fig. 3.8 Future GHG projections, Business as Usual (BAU). (a) Our projection of global emission 
of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, expressed as CO2-eq, for a BAU approach; shaded region repre-
sents uncertainty based on various population pathways (grey). Global emissions of CO2FF + 
CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O from RCP 2.6, 4.5, and 8.5, as indicated. Four projections of global emissions 
for the Kyoto basket of GHGs from JRC (Kitous and Keramidas 2015) are shown: BAU, their 
analysis of the INDCs, and their estimate of the pathway needed to achieve the Paris upper limit of 
2 °C warming. The INDC projections of JRC are for unconditional only (upper orange curve) and 
unconditional plus conditional (lower orange curve). Finally, the global GHG emission BAU pro-
jection for 2030 from PBL (Admiraal et al. 2015) is shown. (b) Our projection of contributions to 
CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O from the US, China, India, Annex I*, and non-Annex I*, all for 
BAU. (c) Per-capita emission of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O from the five groups, based on our 
projections in panel (b). See Methods for further information
sions follow the submitted INDC, for the 117 nations that have submitted uncondi-
tional INDCs to UNFCCC at the time of writing, that include specific quantifiable 
reductions in GHG emissions. For a few nations, which shall remain unnamed, our 
best interpretation of their INDC leads to emissions that are larger than we have 
forecast under BAU. In these instances, the INDC-based forecast is used. Most of the 
3.3 Future Emissions
134
INDCs extend to 2030. The INDC-specific projections of CO2-eq emissions extend 
to the target year of each submission.20 From that year onward, CO2-eq emissions are 
assumed to remain constant: hence, the use of “Hold” for this scenario.
Our AHUNC projections of CO2-eq are in extremely close agreement with the 
unconditional INDC projections of PBL and JRC for year 2030. Our projection 
tends to run higher than that of JRC for the latter years, most likely because they 
have assumed continued improvement in carbon intensity for years after 2030. 
Global emissions remain above RCP 4.5, regardless of population.
20 The majority of the 190 INDCs, about 150, have an end year of 2030. We write “about” because 























































































Fig. 3.9 Future GHG projections, Paris Unconditional INDCs, Attain and Hold. Same as Fig. 3.8, 
except our projections and that of PBL Netherlands (data point at 2030) are for our respective 
analyses of the Paris INDCs, considering departure from business as usual only for nations that 
have submitted unconditional INDCs to UNFCCC. For our projections, we assume all uncondi-
tional INDCs are followed out to the time of the commitment, and from that point onward carbon 
emissions hold steady. BAU projections are used for nations that submitted conditional INDCs, 
and for nations that did not submit an INDC. See Methods for further information
3 Paris INDCs
135
Figure 3.10 shows our projected global emissions of CO2-eq (grey) for a scenario 
we call Attain and Improve, Unconditional (AIUNC). For AIUNC, we again consider 
emissions will follow the specifications of all of the unconditional INDCs that have 
been submitted to UNFCCC. For this scenario, we assume carbon intensity will 
continue to improve, after 2030 (or whatever end year was used in the INDC), out 
to either 2060 or until CO2-eq from a specific nation falls to 50 % of that nation’s 
value in 2030. The projected value of CO2-eq is in extremely close agreement with 
that of PBL in 2030, and the JRC projection that extends to 2050. The AIUNC global 
emissions approach those of RCP 4.5 in 2060, but lie above RCP 4.5 for most popu-
lation projections. Note the strong convergence of per-capita emissions from the 
US, China, India, and Annex I* in 2060 for AIUNC, towards the value of 7.5 t CO2-eq 
ppy (Fig. 3.10c). This convergence is in contrast to per-capita emissions from BAU, 























































































Fig. 3.10 Future GHG projections, Paris Unconditional INDCs, Attain and Improve. Same as Fig. 
3.9, except we assume all of the unconditional INDCs are followed out to the time of the commit-
ment and, from that point onward, CO2-eq emissions continue to decline at the rate that had been 
needed for each nation to have achieved its commitment. The data point for PBL Netherlands is the 
same as that used for Fig. 3.8. See Methods for further information
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Figure 3.11 shows projections for the final scenario, Attain and Improve, 
Unconditional and Conditional (AIUNC+COND). Here, the treatment has been expanded 
to consider all 190 nations that have submitted an INDC, i.e., all plans whether 
conditional or unconditional.21 Note the extraordinary good agreement with the 
21 Some of the INDCs are difficult to interpret quantitatively, with regards to reduction in the emis-
sion of GHGs. When in doubt, we used BAU for all projections. For 166 nations, the GHG emmis-
ion forecast is based on our best interprepation of the INDC.  For the other 24 nations, the forecast 
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Fig. 3.11 Future GHG projections, Paris Unconditional and Conditional INDCs, Attain and 
Improve. Same as Fig. 3.10, except our projections consider both unconditional and conditional 
INDCs. We assume all of the unconditional and conditional INDCs are followed out to the time of 
the commitment and, from that point onward, CO2-eq emissions continue to decline at the rate that 
had been needed for each nation to have achieved its commitment. The data point for PBL 
Netherlands is their projection for 2030, based on the unconditional and conditional INDCs. BAU 




PBL projection for 2030, and the JRC time series, both of which consider 
 unconditional and conditional INDCs. Our analysis of the INDCs was conducted 
in-house, independent of PBL and JRC. A fair amount of judgement was needed to 
assess some of the plans. We have some trepidation about the veracity of the terms 
for a few nations (again, unnamed) in the INDC maps shown in Methods. 
Nonetheless, Fig. 3.11a shows remarkably good agreement between our indepen-
dent analysis of the INDCs and the estimates of PBL and JRC.
One takeaway from Fig. 3.11 that the Paris Climate Agreement community 
should embrace is that if the world were to: (a) follow the unconditional and condi-
tional INDCs; (b) commit to continued improvement in carbon intensity out to 
2060, then global CO2-eq emission would likely fall below that of RCP 4.5 regard-
less of future population. According to our Empirical Model of Global Climate 
projections, RCP 4.5 is the 2 °C pathway (Chap. 2). Of course, as is well known 
either from this book by now or from the literature (Rogelj et al. 2016), the CMIP5 
GCMs indicate a steeper path of CO2-eq emission reductions is needed to achieve 2 
°C. The JRC pathway to achieve 2 °C warming, which is based on these GCMs, is 
illustrated on the top panel of Figs. 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11.
We encourage critical evaluation of our EM-GC approach as well as the GCM 
forecasts, by other researchers, so that the COP of UNFCCC community has a 
means to evaluate these starkly contrasting assessments of how steep GHG  emission 
must be reduced, to achieve the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement. In Chap. 4, 
Implementation, we consider both the RCP 4.5 and RCP 2.6 scenarios.
3.4  Methods
Many of the figures use data from publically available sources. Here, webpage 
addresses of these archives, citations, and details regarding how data and model 
output have been processed are provided. Only those figures with “see methods for 
further information” in the caption are addressed below. Electronic copies and ani-
mations of the figures are available on-line at http://parisbeaconofhope.org.
Figure 3.1 shows total global emissions of atmospheric CO2 from fossil fuels 
and global population. The CO2 emissions data were obtained from two files hosted 
by the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) at the US Department 




The first file was used for CO2 emissions from 1820 to 2013; the second file was 
used to obtain data for 2014. The population data shown in Fig. 3.1a and that was 
used to find pCGL shown in Fig. 3.2 originate from two sources. For years up to 




were used. For 1950 onward, global population is based on 2015 revision of data 
assembled by the Population Division of the United Nations Department of 




Figure 3.2 shows total global emissions of atmospheric CO2 due to the combus-
tion of fossil fuels (CO2FF) and land use change (CO2LUC), emissions of CH4 and N2O 
expressed as CO2-equivalent, and global population. The data used for CO2FF and 
population are the same as described above for Fig. 3.1. Emissions for CO2LUC, CH4, 
and N2O are based on Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) values from 
files hosted by PICR (Meinshausen et al. 2011) at:
http://www.pik-potsdam.de/~mmalte/rcps/data
Data from file 20THCENTURY_EMISSIONS.DAT were used for years up to 2005, 
the last year covered in this file. Data from file RCP85_EMISSIONS.DAT were 
used for 2005–2014, because observed CH4 over the past decade is closer to CH4 
from the RCP 8.5 scenario than any of the other three RCP scenarios. The RCP 
emissions for CH4 are in units of 106 metric tons of CH4 (Mt CH4) and are converted 
to the CO2-eq units used in Fig. 3.2 by multiplying the RCP data by 10−3 Gt/Mt × 
28, where 28 is the GWP of CH4 for a 100-year time horizon (IPCC (2013); see also 
Table 1.1). The conversion for N2O requires an extra step. The RCP emissions for 
N2O are in units of 106 metric tons of N (Mt N). However, the N represents both 
nitrogen atoms in a molecule of N2O. As such, the conversion is accomplished by 
multiplying the RCP data by 10−3 Gt/Mt × 265 × (44/28), where 265 is the GWP of 
N2O for a 100-year time horizon (IPCC (2013); see also Table 1.1) and 44/28 is the 
ratio of the molecular weight of N2O to the molecular weight of N2.
Figure 3.3 compares global emissions of CH4 and N2O from two databases. The 
top panel shows results from RCP, based on the same files as described for Fig. 3.2. 
Figure 3.3b compares emissions of CH4 from RCP to emissions from version 4.2 
FT2012 of the Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) 
database (Rogelj et al. 2014) from the World Total row of file EDGARv42FT2012_ 
CH4.xls, found at:
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=42FT2012
Figure 3.3c compares emissions of N2O from RCP to emissions from EDGAR. The 
EDGAR time series is based on file EDGARv42FT2012_N2O.xls from the same 
site, again using the EDGAR World Total entry.
Figure 3.4 shows maps of emissions of CO2FF from individual nations, termed 
CO2FF-IN. Data are from the US CDIAC (Boden et al. 2013) placed on-line at:
http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_coun.html
Current political boundaries are used for all four panels, and for all map plots in this 
chapter. Carbon emission from the former USSR is all that is available prior to 
1992. Therefore, for years prior to 1992, former members of the USSR are assigned 




USSR sum in 1992, times the total for USSR value for earlier years. The change in 
political boundaries for the rest of the world (i.e., Czech Republic and Slovakia of 
the former Czechoslovakia; Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia of the former Yugoslavia; etc.) was handled in the 
same manner.
Figure 3.5 shows maps of per-capita emissions of CO2FF from individual nations. 
Data for CO2FF-IN are the same as described in Methods for Fig. 3.4. Population data 
are from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, as 
described in Methods for Fig. 3.1.
Figure 3.6 shows maps of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O from individual nations. 
Data for CO2FF-IN are as described for Fig. 3.4. Data for emissions of CH4 and N2O 
for individual nations are from version 4.2 FT2012 of the Emissions Database for 
Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) database (Rogelj et al. 2014), available 
on-line at:
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=42FT2012
Data for CO2LUC from individual nations are from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, available on line at:
http://faostat3.fao.org/download/G2/GL/E
A description of the FAO CO2LUC data set, and estimates of CO2 released by LUC 
from other groups, is given by Houghton et al. (2012). These estimates are available 
starting in 1990.
Figure 3.7 shows maps of per-capita emissions of CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O 
from individual nations. Emission data are the same as for Fig. 3.6, and the popula-
tion of individual nations is from the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, as described in Methods for Fig. 3.1.
Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 show projections of emissions of 
CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, in CO2-eq, for business as usual (BAU) (Fig. 3.8) and the 
three scenarios for the Paris INDCs (Figs. 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11). Each is described below.
Figure 3.8 shows projections of future CO2-eq emissions for BAU. These projec-
tions were found by analyzing the world based on division into five groups: US, 
China, India, Annex I* nations (all nations listed in Table 3.1 other than US), and 
non-Annex I* (all nations not listed in Table 3.1 other than China and India). For 
each of these groups, carbon intensity (IC) was calculated over years 2000–2014,23 
where IC is defined as the quotient of Σ(CO2EQ-IN) divided by Σ(GDP). This approach 
is the same as used by Friedlingstein et al. (2014), except our projections use CO2-eq 
emissions rather than CO2FF emissions. Values of GDP were obtained from the 
OECD (2016) database, on line at:
https://data.oecd.org/gdp/gdp-long-term-forecast.htm
23 The use of 2000–2014 to define trends in IC is somewhat arbitrary. The use of a much shorter time 
span introduces noise into the analysis, due to temporary economic fluctuations that are not reflec-
tive of decadal time-scale shifts. The use of a much longer time span introduces outdated technol-
ogy into the analysis. We have chosen 2000 as the start time because this represents an inflection 
in both the global value of CO2-eq (Fig. 3.2a) and the global per-capita value of this quantity (Fig. 
3.2b). The projections shown in Fig. 3.8 are insensitive to small changes in the start date, particu-
larly if the start year for defining trends in IC is pushed forward in time by a few years.
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In all cases, GDP is based on purchasing power parity in units of 1012 2010 US dol-
lars (USD). In other words, we use carbon emissions and GDP for the US, China, 
and India, since future carbon emissions from these three nations are highlighted in 
the figures, whereas we use aggregate sums for carbon emission and GDP for the 
two other groups. The quantity IC has units of Gt CO2-eq /1012 USD. For the five 
groups above, in the order listed, IC declined at an annual rate of 2.06, 2.48, 2.18, 
2.20, and 2.05 % from 2000 to 2014. The world is becoming more carbon 
efficient.
Figures 3.12 and 3.13 show global maps of BAU projections of the emissions of 
CO2FF + CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O, in CO2-eq units, for 2030 and 2060. For the US, 
China, and India, future carbon emissions for BAU were found by multiplying the 
OECD projection of GDP by the projection of IC, where IC was assumed to decline 
at a rate of 2.06 % per year for the US. For projections of future CO2-eq emissions 
from China and India, IC was assumed to decline at 2.48 % and 2.18 % per year, 
respectively. For the rest of the world, BAU projections of CO2-eq emissions were 
made using the OECD GDP projection for that group, combined with the rate of 
decline of IC from that nations group (2.20 % per year for Annex I*, and 2.05 % per 
year for non-Annex I*). The specific contribution to future GHG emissions from 
any nation in the Annex I* or non-Annex I* group, which constitute the data shown 
in Figs. 3.12 and 3.13, was found from the product of the ratio of that nation's 
 relative contribution to the emission total from the group in year 2014, times the 
projected future emission from the entire group.
The rest of world (nations other than the US, China, and India) have been com-
bined in this aggregate fashion for numerous reasons. Since the US, China, and 
India were the top emitters in 2010, and are projected to remain the top emitters out 
to 2060, it seems appropriate to highlight these three nations in Figs. 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 
and 3.11. Also, trends in IC for some nations are skewed by jumps in CO2LUC that 
appear to be unrealistic. The 28 members of the European Union at the time of the 
Paris meeting submitted a single INDC, further supporting the validity of an aggre-
gate approach. Finally, GDP forecasts are not available for many nations, particu-
larly those in the non-Annex I* list. Hence, the use of a Kaya Identity approach for 
projecting future emissions involves some aggregation of data.
We recognize the future forecast for BAU from a nation that has already greatly 
reduced its value of IC, such as Germany, does not fare well under our aggregate 
method. In other words, the CO2-eq values for Germany shown in Figs. 3.12 and 
3.13 are likely over-estimates, because Germany has reduced GHG emissions more 
quickly than the nations with which it has been combined. However, the success of 
Germany for large scale transition to renewables has been prominently mentioned 
in Sect. 3.2, and is emphasized in Chap. 4. We present maps in the form of Figs. 3.12 
and 3.13, rather than tabular information for individual countries, to let the reader 
know we have indeed treated all 196 nations and 18 territories (Falkland Islands, 
Gibraltar, Greenland, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, etc.) of the world in our forecasts, 
while at the same time emphasizing that our approach is designed to provide realis-
tic forecasts for the world in aggregate rather than for all nations.
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Fig. 3.12 Atmospheric GHG emission maps, Paris INDCs, 2030. National emissions of CO2FF + 
CO2LUC + CH4 + N2O in units of 109 metric tons of CO2-eq per year (Gt CO2-eq year−1), projected 
to 2030, for the BAU, AHUNC, and AIUNC+COND scenarios
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Figure 3.8c shows per-capita emissions. Per-capita carbon emissions were found 
using mid-fertility future population estimates provided by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Methods, Fig. 3.1). The grey shaded 
region in Fig. 3.8a represents the uncertainty in future values of CO2-eq, due to 
population. This was computed by fixing per-capita emission for each nation of the 
Fig. 3.13 Atmospheric GHG emission maps, Paris INDCs, 2060. Same as Fig. 3.12, but for 2060
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world, at the value calculated using the mid-fertility forecast, then re-computing 
CO2-eq emission for either the high-fertility estimate of future population (upper 
extent of shaded region) or low-fertility estimate (bottom bound).
Figure 3.9 shows projections of CO2-eq for the Attain and Hold (Unconditional) 
scenario. Here, future carbon emissions are held at BAU if a country did not submit 
an INDC, or if the INDC was purely conditional. For the US, the INDC is straight-
forward to implement. The last year for which CO2-eq is available for the US, as for 
all nations, is 2014. We have assumed CO2-eq from the US declines by 2.38 %/year, 
from 2015 to 2025, which leads to a value for CO2-eq from the US in 2025 that is 
27 % below the 2005 value.
The INDC submitted by China focuses solely on emissions of CO2. Therefore, in 
all of our projections, we have assumed BAU for emissions of CH4 and N2O from 
China. The INDC from China sets a goal of 60 to 65 % reduction of IC, relative to 
the 2005 value, in year 2030. We use 62.5 % in all of our projections. Our imple-
mentation of this goal for China, using GDP from OECD, leads to their emissions 
peaking in year 2026.
The INDC submitted by India has been interpreted to be part unconditional and 
part conditional. The unconditional component for India reduces IC by 22.5 % by 
2020, relative to 2005, assuming an 8 % per year growth in GDP. The conditional 
INDC for India imposes additional improvement on IC, such that by 2030 it is 
reduced by 35 % of the 2005 value. The proposed additional carbon sink by India is 
applied to this CO2 land use term.
It would take more pages than allocated to describe how each and every INDC 
was handled. Generally, the INDCs fall into three categories. Many give specific 
emission targets for CO2-eq, in terms of percentage reduction relative to a base year. 
For countries that give specific targets, most use a base year of either 1990 or 2005. 
All European Union nations have based their emission targets off of 1990 values. 
The preference for 1990 is perhaps a holdover from the Kyoto Protocol. Projections 
of CO2-eq emissions for INDCs that have specific targets are straightforward to 
implement.
Another group of nations have submitted plans to reduce their emission a certain 
percentage amount, relative to BAU. The implementation of these INDCs is a bit 
more subjective, as the BAU trajectory must first be calculated. Nonetheless, BAU 
projections have been found for all nations as outlined above, and the INDC com-
mitment then leverages off our BAU projections for this group of INDCs.
A third type of INDC is based on reductions in carbon intensity, or IC. Evaluation 
requires calculation of IC for BAU, which is done as outlined above. There is again 
some subjectivity, as one must choose which prior years to use for the BAU projec-
tion of IC. And, as noted above, for some nations IC is particularly difficult to assess, 
due to large jumps in CO2LUC. We expect all of these complications will soon be 
addressed at upcoming meetings of the Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC.
The last detail that must be described is Attain and Hold (AH) versus Attain and 
Improve (AI). For countries that have submitted specific emission targets for their 
INDC, such as the US, the emissions under AH are held fixed at the targeted value 
(which for the US is 4.81 Gt CO2-eq per year, 27 % below the 2005 value) for all 
years after the specified end year of the INDC (which for the US, is 2025). For 
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countries that submitted carbon emission intensity targets, such as China and India, 
for all years after the specified end year (which is 2030 for both China and India), 
the annual decline of carbon intensity is assumed to revert to BAU. For countries 
that have submitted INDCs that reflect a percentage reduction relative to BAU, 
under AH the percentage difference between the BAU and INDC values of CO2-eq 
is held fixed, for all years after the INDC end year (i.e., we assume emissions from 
these countries continue to “hold” steady at the same reduction, relative to BAU, for 
the latter years).
Under the AI projections, national CO2-eq emissions are extrapolated forward in 
time, from the end year of the INDC out to 2060. Under AI, for these countries, 
values of CO2-eq are linearly extrapolated forward in time, for the out years. For the 
US we have extrapolation pCEQ-IN from 13.9 t CO2-eq ppy in 2025, the value achieved 
under the INDC submitted by the US, to 7.2 t CO2-eq ppy in year 2060. This target 
value in 2060 matches the projection of the Annex I* nations, and is slightly less 
than the value of pCEQ-IN for China in 2060, 8.0 t CO2-eq ppy. For countries that have 
submitted INDCs based on carbon intensity, then for years after the end of the INDC 
under AH, values of IC found under BAU for the country’s group are assumed to 
replace the state improvement in IC. In other words, under AH for these countries, 
we assume the market will control IC in the latter years. Under AI for the carbon 
intensity based INDCs, then IC is allowed to continue to decline, at the annual rate 
needed to achieve the goal of the INDC, for the years between the end date of the 
INDC and 2060. Finally, there were a few INDCs that are not easily classified as 
having either specific targets, being tied to BAU, or leveraging off of carbon inten-
sity. We used our best judgement for how to handle each of these special cases.
The final detail is that in all cases for AI we have set a floor for CO2-eq from 
individual nations, such that it can never fall more than 50 % below the value 
assumed for 2030.24 The INDCs of some nations commit to much more aggressive 
reductions in CO2-eq than those of other nations. Ultimately, it seemed unrealistic 
to have CO2-eq from these nations drop more than 50 % below the 2030 value, when 
other nations had not yet moved their respective needles. Like many of our assump-
tions, this too is clearly subject to considerable debate.
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